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Abstract. Some theists have adopted materialism for human persons. They 
associate this metaphysics with their belief in resurrection and focus on 
problems arising from personal identity, temporal gaps or material constitution, 
but, in this paper, I argue that being a materialist for human persons leads to 
an  epistemological problem regarding our knowledge of God’s life. The only 
way to avoid this problem is to choose a particular materialist metaphysics for 
human persons, that is, a constitution theory that emphasizes the irreducibility 
of the first-person perspective.
The coherence of theism has been challenged at length, but most of 
the time, divine attributes are examined. The internal coherence –  for 
example, is it possible to be omnipotent?  –, the coherence between 
a divine attribute and the others – for example, is it possible to be free 
and omniscient?  – or the coherence of some attributes with world 
features such as evil were under fire for decades. Religious language and 
philosophical language about God have also been strongly considered. In 
this article, I would like to examine a particular case of another general 
problem. Using philosophical tools to express theistic claims requires 
us to verify if this use is compatible with our practice of philosophy of 
religion. In Schmitt (2012), regarding divine simplicity, I tried to clarify 
some implications of the choice of a particular ontology. Now, I will focus 
on the compatibility between theistic materialism and the epistemology 
of religious beliefs, or more narrowly on the epistemology of philosophy 
of religion.
Atheism is commonly associated with materialism for human 
persons (MHP). By MHP, I  mean an  ontological theory based upon 
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this principle: a  person is a  material object without any non-material 
substantial part. I  insist on the negation of non-material substantial 
part because we can conceive consciousness as a  part of the personal 
life or instantiations of properties as formal parts or ontological parts 
of the person. But, these kinds of parts, if they exist, are not substantial. 
Then, if like Descartes in his letter to Regius (January 1642), we consider 
that a human being is a substantial union of both a soul and a material 
body, we are not proponents of MHP, this seems pretty obvious. But if 
we believe that qualia exist and that they are not supported by any non-
material substance, we are indeed materialist for human persons (HP). 
Usually, atheism is associated with materialism and it is fair to say that 
atheism is generally implied by materialism. The implication here is of 
course indirect but I summarize what could be a powerful argument for 
atheism if materialism appears to be true.
Proponents of Christian materialism such as Peter van Inwagen, 
Trenton Merricks or Lynne Rudder Baker try to accommodate their 
views on HP, that is MHP, and the core doctrine of their religion, 
Christianity in that case. Of course, some Jews or some Muslims could 
defend the compatibility of MHP with their beliefs. Nevertheless, I will 
focus on Christian materialism, or to say it more carefully, on arguments 
developed by Christian philosophers, but resurrection or survival are 
accepted beyond Christian communities, and then I hope my argument 
will have a wider interest, much of what is said can be applied to other 
religions and traditions and of course, it concerns atheists and theists 
as well.
Resurrection is one of the most commonly debated subjects for those 
who defend both MHP and theism. If a human person is only a material 
substance, it seems that she will vanish when she dies, when her heart or 
her brain activities stop. But fortunately, God has powerful means and 
can keep her and us alive and let our corpses slowly disappear. For the 
sake of the argument, I  will accept that the conjunction of MHP and 
theism concerning resurrection is coherent.1 Nevertheless, this trend of 
thoughts, if coherent and possibly true, leads to a currently unnoticed 
epistemological problem. For a  theist, God is a  spiritual substance or 
a spiritual agent, even if by ‘spiritual substance’ or ‘spiritual agent’ she 
1 See van Inwagen (1998), Zimmerman (1999) and Baker (1995; 2007). See also 
Merricks (1999) for a sceptical position on how resurrection can take place if we adopt 
a MHP.
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means something analogical with what is usually called ‘a  spiritual 
substance’ or ‘a  spiritual agent’. But a  materialist for HP believes that 
these notions are associated with false beliefs and illusions, especially 
the concept of a spiritual agent with mental properties. Hence, there is 
an epistemological objection based on MHP against theism. My point is 
that some kind of MHP can face out this epistemological challenge and 
some cannot. More precisely, taken together as complementary theories, 
MHP and an  account of the non-reductionist first-person perspective 
(FPP) can lead to satisfactory theistic representations of God.
The materialist account of survival leads to an epistemological problem 
for MHP. In order to believe rationally that God intends to save people 
or wants that a miracle happens, etc., we have to master some mental 
concepts such as intention, preference, hope, knowledge, etc. But these 
concepts have an initial meaning when they apply to human persons and 
maybe to some animals. The difference between finite and infinite beings 
leads to well-known semantic problems in philosophy of religion. My 
point is to emphasize other difficulties in transferring mental concepts 
used for HP conceived as material beings to a spiritual being. No human 
person provides a ground for comparisons or analogies because we do 
not entertain any natural knowledge of a spiritual or mental substance. 
Neither introspection or external perception are acquaintances with 
a non-material substance enduring a mental and non-physical life.
Suppose you are a type-type identity proponent regarding the mind-
body problem. You cannot apply your concept of knowledge to God 
because you already know that this concept is only satisfied by a material 
being, maybe a certain structure of the brain. But a materialist for HP 
does not have to adopt such a  strong reductionist view, functionalists 
have already refuted the type-type theory at length and I will adopt their 
critiques.
Now suppose you are a token-token proponent. The problem for MHP 
is not related to our use of mental concepts but to events. If any mental 
event is a material event, or if any mental property instance is a physical 
property instance, how can we believe that God instantiates mental 
properties  ? I  think two answers can be suggested, two unsatisfying 
answers indeed.
1) Some psychologists explain that young and older people are 
spontaneously dualists.2 For people who entertain dualist intuitions, 
2 See for example Bloom (2007).
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mental concepts or properties apply to an immaterial substance, their soul 
or simply themselves. So they entertain an attribution practice based on 
some illusory intuitions. But this practice is useful in everyday life, it does 
the job perfectly. Why could we not use it for God? Anthropomorphism 
could be a way to be related to God, provided some strong restrictions 
on what is projected from human to God. But using a  global illusion 
to practice philosophy of religion is not satisfying at all. Suppose you 
want to defend the existence of free will on the assumption that we have 
a deceiving conception of our voluntary acts. Maybe you could deal with 
everyday practices and talks about volitions and freedom but you are 
surely not in position to argue for the existence of free will, and neither 
are you in position to explain free will properties.
2) The second proposal in order to solve the epistemological problem 
can be found in van Inwagen’s papers on dualism and materialism.3 He 
does not include events in his ontology and this exclusion could, in the 
first place, facilitate the development of a theistic account of MHP. Van 
Inwagen argues that properties and substances are the only elements 
of his ontology. He assumes that all substances can be and are material 
(except God) and that they exemplify different properties. Instead of the 
misleading difference between physical and mental properties, he claims 
that properties are different in content but not in nature. Some properties 
attribute mental aspects to substances which are purely material, and 
some attribute physical aspects. All properties have the same nature, 
they are abstract entities but these abstract entities have very different 
contents (that is, mental or physical contents). Then a material substance 
can have mental and physical properties, identical in nature but different 
in content. No dualistic conception of persons is required. The important 
point when we are dealing with the philosophy of religion problem is 
that mental properties have a content independent of the substances that 
instantiate them.
At this stage of reasoning, one could find an elegant way to defend 
mental properties attribution to God conceived as a  non-material 
substance and, at the same time, to HP conceived as material beings. 
There are no physical events different form mental events in any kind of 
substance, but only events which are not defined by the content of the 
property but by the nature of the substance. So there are human events 
when physical and mental properties are instantiated by human beings 
3 See van Inwagen (1995; 2007).
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and they are divine events when mental properties are instantiated by 
God. The content of mental properties that we know from our experience 
of ourselves and others can be attributed to God. Van Inwagen goes 
further. There is no need for events. A  well founded attribution of 
mental properties to God could be assumed. God, a spiritual substance, 
instantiates properties with a  mental content and does not instantiate 
properties with a physical content, all mentions of events is omitted.
Of course, the proponent of this kind of solution has to develop 
a very abstract account of mental properties. In a  functionalist theory 
of mind, mental properties are more general and abstract than physical 
properties. Being afraid is a  mental property or state more general 
than having a  certain neurological structure. For MHP in a  theistic 
perspective, the point is that having a  mental property characterizes 
physical and spiritual substances, animals, human persons and God. But 
is it really possible or legitimate to apply a concept to a mental substance 
if the first thing we know is that a mental substance is just an unknown 
substance or worth a kind of substance about which, in the first place, we 
only have illusions.
Van Inwagen argues that there is a real mystery in the possibility of 
subjective experiences in a material entity not because of the physical 
nature of persons but because of the mystery of the FPP relative to 
thoughts. We can use an  argument provided by van Inwagen. Van 
Inwagen explains that we cannot appeal to the mystery of the body’s 
identity or of the life’s continuity in the case of life after death. Even if 
God’s nature is mysterious or unknowable, there is no good reason to 
think that we cannot understand, or almost understand, our material 
constitution. So we should find an explanation of bodily resurrection and 
that is what van Inwagen provides in his paper. If we should accept that 
God’s nature is mysterious, why do we have to believe that our thinking 
nature is mysterious? I do not see strong reasons for that.
More pressing: if the instantiation of a property with a mental content 
is mysterious, it is far less than what a theist materialist for HP has to deal 
with. Maybe thinking is mysterious, but then a thinking substance is far 
more mysterious. Being conscious of our limits, especially when we try 
to think about God, is an intellectual virtue. But if the substance and the 
instantiation of the property are mysterious, what are we thinking about 
when we talk about God’s intention, intentional action etc., that is when 
we practice philosophy of religion? Should we adopt a radical negative 
theology? Like Bartleby, I would prefer not to. Invoking some analogy 
298 YANN SCHMITT
between our thoughts and God is also a dead end if we do not know any 
thinking substance and declare that thinking, even for human persons, 
is a mysterious event or situation.
Another solution for the materialist for HP who wants to defend 
theism can be deduced from the aporias of van Inwagen’s account. 
It is a  middle way between substance dualistic accounts of HP and 
animalism, the reduction of HP to living animals, a position assumed by 
van Inwagen. FPP has to be emphasized in this third way (Baker 2001; 
2013) because it has persistence conditions which preclude animalism 
and do not imply dualism.
If a FPP characterizes HP, if a HP is a material substance, and if we 
have a clear theory of these facts, then we can think about God, at least 
analogically. I take Baker’s account to be a very promising way to rebut 
the epistemological objection.
The FPP for a human person is defined by Lynne Rudder Baker like 
this:
An ability to conceive of oneself as oneself, from the first person, without 
recourse to a name, description, or other third-person referring device. 
(2013: 31)
The rudimentary stage of FFP can be found in mammals or infants. They 
do have consciousness and they act from a FPP, but they cannot conceive 
themselves as themselves, because of the lack of self concepts. Only adult 
human persons can have this ability illustrated or expressed by a reflexive 
use of pronouns in sentences like: ‘I protested that I was overcharged.’ 
In such cases, I conceive myself as myself, I use self concepts in order 
to perform self attributions. My relation to myself does not depend on 
a  view from nowhere, neither on someone’s point of view but on my 
singular point of view. Being able to use self concepts characterizes the 
robust stage of FPp. This evolved stage depends on language with first 
person terms mastered by adults or not too young children. It is often 
called self consciousness and Baker thinks FPP is essential to the person.
If FPP is not reducible to a third-person perspective or eliminable, it 
seems that we should defend some kind of dualism, for example a cartesian 
dualism for whom the FPP indicates the existence of a soul, a mental or 
spiritual substance different from the body which can be analyzed from 
a  third-person perspective. Baker argues that the acknowledgment of 
the irreducibility of the FPP or the impossibility of eliminating the FPP 
does not imply any rejection of naturalism or materialism. Naturalism 
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in the broad sense (Baker 2000: 22) or materialism about the natural 
order only claim that there is no need for any soul or supernatural being 
if we want to understand the first-person ability. It does not exclude the 
possible existence of a God, but focusing on human thoughts, we can 
defend a genuine materialist theory of persons and the irreducible FPP 
as an ability of a material substance and not as an essential attribute of 
a mental substance separated from the body.
I  accept without any further justification the irreducibility or the 
impossibility of eliminating FPP in a  MHP because if it were not the 
case we would be back to some already examined claims very closed 
to van Inwagen’s. Some could find that this strategy presupposes too 
much. The irreducibility or the impossibility of eliminating the FPP are 
strong claims that need powerful arguments which I shall not provide 
but my point is just to examine if, in philosophy of religion or in 
religious practices, someone can start a reasoning with the premise that 
a materialist conception of the mind is true.
Summarizing her materialist conception of HP, Baker explains:
We whole persons are constituted by whole bodies. Brains have a special 
role in providing the mechanisms that make possible our mental lives. 
But it is not my brain itself that would like to go on a river cruise; it is 
not my brain that regrets having offended you. I did it; I regret it. And 
I am not identical to a brain. Neither brains nor minds are subjects of 
experience or are rational or moral agents; we persons are. (2011: 63)
To understand how materialism can be defended and how FPP makes 
a  genuine difference in contrast with third-person perspective, the 
constitution relation is fundamental. Every particular individual is 
constituted by one or more aggregates of material particles. But what 
constitutes an  individual is not what is identical with this individual. 
Persons are not their body like Michelangelo’s David is not the piece of 
marble which constitutes the statue. The primary kind of David is not 
the primary kind of the piece of marble, and then, there are two objects.
Constitution is a relation between identity and separated existence. 
Constitution is not identity because it does not satisfy Leibniz’s law, 
that is the identity of indiscernibles. David and the piece of marble have 
different modal properties so they cannot be identical, they are two 
different objects. For example, if someone melts the piece of marble, this 
piece still exists but is carved into another shape, and at the same time 
David was destroyed. The persistence conditions of David and of the 
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piece of marble are different, their modal properties are not identical. 
So, from Leibniz’s law, David and the piece of marble are not identical. 
Constitution is also linked to the necessity of identity, that is if x is 
identical with y, then necessarily x is identical with y. No need here to 
enter in the controversial conception of a contingent identity.
But the relation of constitution is not mere coincidence between two 
objects located at the very same place. David depends on the piece of 
marble and on favourable circumstances, its aesthetic properties depend 
on the physical properties of the marble, on the form taken by the piece 
of marble and on its relations to artists, critics and maybe other statues 
and artworks – those are the favourable circumstances. It is worth noting 
that among the properties of David, there are extrinsic but essential 
properties such as being an object in the artistic world. So mereology 
cannot deal with constitution, mereological composition is not sufficient 
to analyze the emergence of David’s properties from the properties of the 
piece of marble and from the artistic world.
So constitution is an  asymmetric relation that introduces 
an ontological hierarchy because David is more complex than the piece 
of marble. David does not simply supervene on the piece of marble, 
supervenience characterizes a relation between properties of an object 
and not the relation between two objects. Of course, when an object is 
constituted by another one, it has new properties, especially new causal 
powers. These new causal powers indicate the existence of a new object 
dependent on the former but not identical with it.
The difference between body and person is maybe clearer now: two 
objects belong to two primary kinds but only one constitutes the other. 
The persistence conditions of a body which is a human organism could 
be the persistence of a  shape or of a  life belonging to human species. 
The difficulty of defining clear persistence conditions for any body is 
that bodies always gain and lose particles and always seem to change. 
The person does not face this unceasing change or the change in the 
person does not seem to be dependent on the gain or loss of a particle. So 
from Leibniz’s law, we should acknowledge that persons are not identical 
with their bodies. But human persons are necessarily embodied, that 
they have to have a body in order to entertain a FPp. Being necessarily 
embodied does not imply that this person is necessarily composed of 
this body. A change in the body and maybe a change of the body itself is 
not incompatible with the persistence of the person if mechanisms that 
support our person-level activities or states operate.
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This point urges us to understand how resurrection is possible if we are 
material beings with a FPP, that is persons constituted by material bodies. 
Baker (1995) exposes different conceptions of resurrection coherent with 
different non-dualistic views about HP. If you believe in an intermediate 
state between death and life after death, it is not a necessary condition 
that you have a  soul sleeping in Christ but an  intermediate and pre-
resurrected body can have the same role. What is more surprising in 
Baker’s defence of a  non-dualistic conception of resurrection is her 
acceptation of temporal gaps. If persons are not composed of a soul and 
a body but constituted of a body, when they die, it seems that the body 
disappears, and then the person constituted of it also vanishes. Baker 
recalls van Inwagen’s treatment of this problem (van Inwagen: 1998). 
She agrees with his analysis of Augustine’s manuscript but departs from 
his rejection of temporal gap for HP. Augustine’s manuscript cannot be 
resurrected by God because in order to be a Augustine’s manuscript, the 
piece of matter that composed it has to have Augustine in its origin and 
in the causes that lead to the manuscript. Therefore, even God cannot 
produce a  genuine Augustine’s manuscript by himself. But human 
person resurrection does not depend, says Baker, on the origin, namely 
two other human persons, or at least parts of them, but it depends only 
on some body which is able to constitute the same person God wants to 
resurrect.
If creation of a  resurrected body is within the power of God at all, it 
seems to me equally in his power to produce the conditions necessary for 
the body to constitute Smith, where what makes Smith the person she is 
are her characteristic intentional states, including first-person reference 
to her body. The fact that a certain resurrection body would not exist 
without the direct intervention of God is irrelevant to whether or not 
it was Smith’s body – just as the fact that a certain bionic body would 
not exist without the direct intervention of scientists and surgeons is 
irrelevant to whether or not it is Smith’s body. (Baker 1995: 499)
Here an important point is worth to be noticed. It is not necessary for 
resurrection that the same body still exists or returns to life, it is more 
important that the same person, a material person, is still alive or returns 
to life. The resurrected person only needs to be constituted of a body that 
allows her to be the very person she was. Her materialism only implies 
that a  person cannot exist without some body but not that a  person 
cannot exist without any body changes (Baker 2011: 1). Michael Rea 
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objects that the resurrected body is a  mere reincarnated body (2009: 
13-4) because it is not the same body. But reincarnation depends on 
a preserved soul which is linked to a new body. In the constitution view, 
no soul is preserved, and then it is very strange to understand this theory 
of survival as a  reincarnation. Despite this concern, I  think Baker’s 
account is more promising. It keeps together two important claims: the 
material person, that is a person constituted by a body, without any other 
entity as a soul, is preserved and it is possible that life after death would 
be highly different from mundane life and so the resurrected body could 
be very different from the mundane body provided it could make the 
person like she was before.4
FPP is not substantial by itself so it cannot be conserved like 
an  autonomous entity. Even strong transformations like the one 
mentioned in the above quotation suppose a  continuity. If a  scientist 
practices a whole change of the particles composing a body, we generally 
believe he does not destroy the body and replaces it by another body 
worked out elsewhere. What is stipulated is that the living body is 
progressively transformed by successive substitutions of some parts. 
With that kind of change, the FPP is preserved because each function of 
the body that is necessary for the FPP is preserved by the thoroughness 
of the surgeon. Baker compares resurrection with this practice but God 
is not a surgeon. In one shot, he replaces the body by another one. This is 
a miracle performed by God which gives us a new life. If FPP depends on 
the proper functioning of the body and if we want to avoid the temporal 
gap problem, we need to say that God has to replace the dead body 
by a resurrected body immediately, this provides the continuity of the 
person we need. But here lies the problem of human nature and of the 
origin of the person pointed out by van Inwagen. The resurrected body is 
a created body and not a natural body. It no longer belongs to the primary 
kind ‘human body’. The organism that constitutes the resurrected person 
does not belong to the species ‘Homo sapiens’ any longer since it was 
created by God as Augustine’s manuscript in van Inwagen’s story. It does 
not preclude that the person treats the resurrected body as her body, she 
can still adopt a FPP on it. It is her body, she refers to it from the inside 
and not from a third-person perspective. But her body is not a human 
4 Baker does not fall in the same problems as Olson (1997) or Corcoran (1998) who 
suppose that human beings are essentially animals or organisms and then have problems 
to think of a resurrection where our body is radically different.
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organism. So the resurrected person is always a person because of her 
FPP but she is not human. Being human is a property that the person 
has derivatively, from her being constituted by a  human organism. If 
the body is not a human organism, the person constituted by this body 
cannot be human, a member of the human species, a point unobserved 
by Baker. Maybe this fact is not a problem. After death, we cannot say 
that a human person is human in a biological sense, belonging to the 
human species is an earthly fact, unlike being resurrected.5 Baker urges 
us to consider that the doctrine of resurrection cannot require identity 
of the earthly body and the resurrected body because the earthly body 
seems essentially corruptible and the resurrected body is not (2011: 9).
I can restate my point in terms of identity. After resurrection, a person 
is numerically the same but qualitatively very different, and this difference 
is manifested by her new body which is generally called a glorified one. 
The problem of the temporal gap can be solved. The numerical identity 
of the body is not presupposed by our theory. The important point is 
that the person is numerically the same. But there is also a  problem 
of temporal gap for personal identity over time. This worry seems less 
pressing for me. I  think we can find a  clear and good analogy of the 
rebirth of the person after death in our earthly life. When a person is 
sleeping and wakes up, it is difficult to say that there is not a temporal 
gap in her life but a  perfect identity over time, despite this temporal 
gap. It is even clearer if we imagine someone in a coma. I do not want 
to suggest that a psychological account of personal numerical identity 
over time is needed. I think I do not have to decide which criterion is 
required or even if a criterion is absolutely required (Merricks 1998). But 
there is no origin problem pointed out by van Inwagen in that case. If 
we allow a temporal gap and then a new production of the body, even if 
the resurrected body is qualitatively the same, the new body is the base 
of emergence or re-emergence of the person. The person is not created 
directly by God as Augustine’s manuscript is in van Inwagen’s story. The 
person like every human person comes into existence because of the 
particular structure of a body in certain environmental conditions.
With this materialist theory of HP, we find grounds for analogy 
between our mental life and God’s one in order to rebut the 
epistemological objection. In our ordinary life, we grasp mental concepts 
5 For Christians, Jesus Christ would be an exception, I do not enter in this particular 
case, because the Incarnation is a very particular case of being a human person.
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and properties and it is legitimate to think of God, at least analogically, 
as a mental substance. We do not project some delusions about us on 
God, we do not claim that there is a fundamental mystery in mental life. 
What has been shown is that theistic materialists have to express their 
beliefs, and especially resurrection, with a  particular metaphysics for 
HP, that is a composition theory of persons which emphasizes FPp. This 
particular metaphysics is required to harmonize religious beliefs and 
their philosophical explication.
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